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Think about what happens as these words are read: Hands turn or scroll the page, eyes move 
over the writing, and psychological processes turn the written forms into the words and 
sentences of a specific language. The process can be described as a dynamic interaction 
between body, brain, and material form. What this description fails to characterise adequately 
is the agency of the material form: It elicits specific behavioural and psychological responses 
in its users, capacities they gain as they become proficient in interacting with it—that is, as 
they learn to read and write. How does a material form like writing become able to influence 
the behaviours and psychological processing of its users? As its form changed under the 
gradual pressure of generations of tinkering and adjustment, it accumulated the cognitive effort 
of past generations and redistributed it to future ones, who simply learned to use the tool and 
modified it further in the course of use. Yet in the moments of interaction—when we read and 
write—writing still seems as static, as permanent, as if it were carved into stone. Its form does 
change, only more slowly than our experience of it suggests. These are aspects of writing that 
demand further investigation. 
 If ancient cognition cannot be studied directly, material forms do provide insight into 
some of the associated behaviours and psychological processing of the ancient peoples who 
once made and used them. Writing, obviously, implies behaviours like handwriting and 
psychological processes like vision and language. When interpreted through neuroscience, 
change in writing implies associated change in the behaviours and brains that produced it. Such 
analysis requires two things: first, a material record with enough duration and extent to show 
change over time in detail, and second, a cognitive state understood well enough that change 
in material form can suggest change in behaviours and brains. 
 Literacy is such a cognitive state, and Mesopotamian writing has a sufficient record of 
material change to suggest, at least in broad outline, how literacy developed. While literacy is 
commonly defined as the ability to read and write, this assumes a script, writing that is capable 
of representing language with fidelity. Script stands in contrast with the initial state of writing, 
which represented language much less faithfully—so poorly, in fact, there is debate over 
whether that language was Sumerian or Akkadian (Englund 1998; Hyman 2006; Veldhuis 
2014). Early Mesopotamian writing took the form of pictures and signs. These were meaningful 
either because they depicted an object or they had an agreed-upon meaning, a social 
convention. For example, a picture of a jar meant jar because it looked like one, and a quartered 
circle meant sheep because everyone agreed it had that meaning. This functional literacy 
depended on this-means-that associations acquirable with far less behavioural and 
psychological change than what is involved in true literacy, the ability to interact with written 
forms that do not depend on resemblance and convention. How the initial cognitive state 
involving early writing yielded literacy and script required change in all three dimensions: the 
behaviours and psychological processes of the writers and the material form of writing itself. 
 The idea is that cognition is a dynamic system composed of brains, bodies, and 
materiality, in which influence among the components is multi-directional. Interaction with 
material forms changes behaviours and brains. Change in behaviours and brains enables further 
 
change to material forms. And material forms accumulate the cognitive effort of past 
generations and act as a medium for recreating those changes in present and future generations. 
There is a social aspect to such change as well: In realising literacy and script from early 
writing, a society had to its behaviours with a specific material form over multiple generations. 
The material form also had to be malleable enough so its form could change as behaviours and 
brains reorganised. 
 Such analysis requires a theoretical framework that can reconcile interdisciplinary data 
from the neuroscience of literacy and the archaeological and textual records of the Ancient Near 
East. In the analysis that follows, the framework applied is Material Engagement Theory 
(Malafouris 2004). MET has three central commitments. First, minds are considered extended 
and enactive. Extended means that material resources may be at least partially constitutive of 
cognition (Clark 2008; Clark and Chalmers 1998). Enactive means cognition is the dynamic 
interactivity between brains, bodies, and materiality (Hutto and Myin 2013). Reading is an 
excellent example of cognition that is extended and enactive, since it is difficult to imagine how 
we would read without the material form that is writing. Second, materiality is viewed as 
influencing change in behaviours and brains. That is, material forms have agency (Jones and 
Boivin 2010; Kirchhoff 2009; Malafouris and Knappett 2008; Newen, De Bruin and Gallagher 
2018). Reading is a good example here as well, as there are specific behavioural and neurological 
reorganisations associated with learning to read and write, such that interacting with the material 
form that is writing changes behaviours and brains. Third, materiality is meaningful in a way that 
differs from language: It is meaningful in virtue of what it is and what we do with it (Malafouris 
2013). Writing is an interesting material form because, as it acquires fidelity to language, it 
becomes more language-like in how it means, signifying rather than resembling or instantiating. 
In the analysis presented here, the focus will be on the second and third of MET’s central 
commitments, the agency and semiotic function of the material form that is writing. 
 An initial MET analysis of change in the material form of Mesopotamian writing 
(Overmann 2016, 2017) yielded a model of how literacy might develop: from the behaviour that 
is handwriting, with a material form malleable enough to permit incremental change occasioned 
by changes in behaviours and psychological processing, and within a specific social context that 
sustains the behavioural interaction with the material form for generations. After the model is 
reviewed, it is critiqued in terms of its original development, goals and shortfalls and potential 
for future expansion. A particular area of expansion is then explored: the way distinct 
neurofunctional and behavioural pressures influence written forms for language and numbers, 
thereby affecting how such forms change across languages and cultures (Overmann 2020). 
 
A Model of How Writing Changed in Mesopotamia, and the Cognitive Implications 
The initial model of how writing changed over time and the cognitive implications of that 
change used Mesopotamia as its case study (Overmann 2016). Data on Mesopotamian writing 
were compiled from the literature and sorted into seven categories, from the making of 
dictionaries known as lexicography to the identifiability of language (fig. 4.1). These data were 
then mapped across time and cultural periods to examine what was changing and when and get 
a sense of how writing changed as a system. If the plot was initially difficult to create, it must 
be noted that when it is turned on its side, it resembles a standard archaeological chronology. 
 
 
Fig. 4.1. Model of Mesopotamian literacy. The seven categories or dimensions of change in the system of writing 
include lexicography, dictionary-like compilations of words; organisation, the layout of words upon the surfaces of 
writing materials; syntax, the ways in which characters, words and phrases are arranged to reflect language; 
orthography, conventionalisations of signs and sign combinations; applications, the purposes to which writing and 
scripts are applied; curriculum, the systemisation of training; and language, the degree to which the language expressed 
is identifiable. The data were sourced from Bramanti (2015), Cooper (1996, 2004), Englund (1998), Hyman (2006), 
Krispijn (2012), Schmandt-Besserat (1992), Taylor (2011, 2015) and Veldhuis (2011, 2012, 2014). Updated version of 
the graph originally published as fig. 9 in Overmann (2016, 297). Additional data were added, and the graph has been 
rotated anticlockwise 90° to emphasise its resemblance to an archaeological chronology. All rights reserved. 
 
 Understanding how change in written form is informative regarding change in behaviours 
and brains starts with what differentiates a literate brain from one that is not literate. In literacy, 
the region of the temporal lobe that recognises physical objects, the fusiform gyrus, becomes 
trained to recognise written characters as if they were physical objects, interpret them through 
the gestures of handwriting and associate them with the meanings and sounds of language 
(Dehaene and Cohen 2007, 2011; McCandliss, Cohen and Dehaene 2003; Nakamura et al. 2012; 
Perfetti and Tan 2013). This neurofunctional reorganisation is common across writing systems, 
whatever their form and regardless of whether signs map to words, syllables or phonemes. 
 Among the changes in the material form of writing, one of the most dramatic is the loss 
of depictiveness. Early signs resembled objects; later signs did not (fig. 4.2). This change has 
been characterised as becoming “increasingly schematic” or abstract (Schmandt-Besserat 
1978, 50), though “abstract” is one of those squishy terms that means different things in 
different contexts. Here it means less depictive, and it suggests that brains were learning to 
recognise characters as objects. Objects are recognised through combinations of their local and 
global features. This works as follows. In fig. 4.3 (left), readers might see a cube in the 
combination of features, though the lines are not actually there. Local features are the circles 
and cut-outs, global features, the relations between them. Recognising words is similar. 
Readers will likely see the words THE CAT in fig. 4.3 (right), though the middle characters 
are neither H nor A. Meaning is derived from the characters themselves, the context of the 
 
adjacent characters forming words and learned associations between written forms and 
language. Trained object recognition and learned lexical associations account for variability in 
script forms and mapping, as the potential for an object to be recognised through its features 
and associated lexically is independent of its actual form. 
 
 
Fig. 4.2. Chronology of signs showing change in form. Early signs (left) are recognisably depictive and differ in 
obvious ways from one another, while later signs (from 2400 BC and thereafter) are less depictive, and the clues 
differentiating them are more subtle. Key: Uruk period, 3500–3000 BC; Early Dynastic (ED) II, 2900–2700 BC; 
ED III, 2700–2340 BC; Old Akkadian (OA), 2340–2200 BC; Ur III, 2100–2000 BC; Old Babylonian (OB), 1900–
1600 BC; Middle Babylonian (MB), 1400–1100 BC; Middle Assyrian (MA), 1400–1000 BC. Adapted from fig. 
88 in Nissen, Damerow and Englund (1993, 111). All rights reserved. 
 
Fig. 4.3. Feature recognition of objects and writing. In both, recognition is a matter of local detail and global cues. 
On the left, a cube is recognisable in the circles and cut-outs (local details) and relations between them (global 
cues). On the right, the words THE CAT are recognisable; meaning is derived from the characters themselves 
(local detail), the context of adjacent characters (global cues) and learned associations between written forms and 
language. Originally published as fig. 2a in Overmann (2016, 288). All rights reserved. 
 
 As brains became trained to recognise features and associate lexically, the need for the 
characters to depict was relaxed. That is, as characters became topologically recognised, they 
could deform. This in turn allowed characters to become more alike and simpler. 
 More alike means there was still some resemblance between early and later written 
forms (fig. 4.2). However, the later forms are closer in appearance to each other than the early 
forms were. That is, the clues distinguishing early signs are more obvious than the clues 
distinguishing later signs. Visual discriminability and individuation—being able to tell 
characters apart and identify single characters as themselves—depend on familiarity. With 
familiarity, objects become easier to tell apart, so the distinguishing clues can become more 
subtle. These effects are also found in facial recognition, particularly across ethnic groups, 
 
where they affect things like eyewitness identifications (Brigham et al. 2007). Topological 
recognition lets characters lose their depictiveness, while differentiating in ways that enhance 
the ability to tell them apart. The range of total variability decreased, while characters 
converged on points of maximal contrast. This is the process whereby graphic elements become 
a contrastive system. This process occurs without change to the way graphic elements are 
mapped to language, so writing can become a contrastive system whether it is logographic, 
syllabic, alphabetic or some combination. This change also shows why training had to become 
more formal: Written characters became too much alike. It had been relatively easy to tell the 
earlier pictures apart and approximate their meaning through resemblance and knowledge of 
conventions. But as characters became more alike, the differences between them were too 
subtle for anyone who lacked familiarity, and gaining the requisite familiarity required training. 
 Simpler means characters lost some of their detail toward the end of the chronology 
shown in fig. 4.2, suggesting an optimisation or balance of local and global detail. Local detail 
helps novices but slows proficient readers, who make greater use of global cues. In later writing 
periods, local details were omitted, suggesting readers made greater use of global cues. This 
had another benefit: The more detail characters have, the longer they take to write, and omitting 
detail enabled the speed of production to increase to the point where writing could become a 
more interactive medium with thought. In modern scripts, this same effect of a trade-off 
between local detail and global cues is found in diacritics for tones in African languages (Bird 
1998, 1999; Koffi 2014) and vowels in Hebrew (Ravid and Haimowitz 2006). Discussion 
involves the potential for having different forms of written language, one for novices and one 
for proficient readers. Of course, the trade-off is that readers have to learn both. 
 Handwriting involves motor movements controlled by Exner’s Area of the brain (Roux 
et al. 2009). Exner’s Area is thought to help us recognise the gesture in the written word, a mental 
simulation (Konnikova 2014). Its activity is particular to handwriting, not just any fine work 
involving the hand, so while it is possible to produce characters by, say, carving them in stone, 
carving differs in both the movements used and the character repetition involved. Writing by 
hand improves fine motor skills, hand–eye coordination, recognition and recall functions, lexical 
retrieval and tolerance for ambiguity in how characters are formed (Giovanni 1994; James and 
Engelhardt 2012; Longcamp, Zerbato-Poudou and Velay 2005; Sülzenbrück et al. 2011). In the 
emergence of literacy, handwriting was critical. Not only did it realise improvements in these 
functions, it afforded a mechanism for continual adjustment of the material form, which was 
essential to the system’s ability to change. Change in handwriting also implies things like 
standardisation, automaticity and tolerance for ambiguity in character form. 
 Standardisation is forming each character with particular strokes in a particular order. 
When writing first began, there was no such protocol; standardisation emerged gradually 
(Bramanti 2015; Taylor 2015). It is seen in the strokes used and the order in which they were 
made, which become increasingly codified. Over time, these codifications show production 
becoming standardised, and standardisation shows handwriting behaviour becoming habitual 
and automatic. Automaticity frees up cognitive resources like attention and working memory 
(Logan 1992; Tucha, Tucha and Lange 2008). The same thing occurs when someone learns to 
drive (Charlton and Starkey 2011). A novice driver must pay significant attention to operating 
the car and conditions on the road. Proficient drivers attend less to these things, becoming alert 
only when conditions change. In writing, automaticity lets authors focus on what they write, 
its content, rather than how, its production. This helps transform writing from a tool that simply 
records mental content to one that lets writers engage it directly. 
 When people write by hand, they develop a tolerance for ambiguity in how characters 
are formed (Longcamp et al. 2005). That is, the writing can become sloppier, while readers can 
 
still recognise it. This lets writers recognise characters, while providing early writing an 
important mechanism for change. This tolerance is one of the things educators fear will be lost 
as we type more and handwrite less (Konnikova 2014), though arguably, the loss will be offset 
by the standardised appearance of characters on screens, and the things computers do really 
well that handwriting cannot, like speed and networking and information lookup and emotional 
expressiveness (e.g., emoticons). 
 Being able to recognise characters even when they are ambiguous is an essential 
element of developing cursive, a form of writing that trades accuracy of form for speed of 
production (Veldhuis 2011). Fast writing keeps up better with the speed of thought, so that 
writing becomes a highly interactive engagement between mental content, material form and 
behaviours interfacing the two. Characteristics of clay surfaces and writing implements also 
influenced how characters were made. Making lines or impressions on clay produces furrows, 
which is how their order of production is determined (Cammarosano 2014). Furrows also mean 
that characters had to be relatively simple and made with deliberation, since complex characters 
and characters made in haste quickly yield an illegible mess. In turn, simplicity improved speed 
of production, while deliberation improved legibility and reduced error. Simplicity also 
influenced production at a fundamental level. Characters taking hours to make would not 
record or communicate information efficiently because of their restricted volume, nor would 
they support the recombination needed to produce new signs. 
 Over some 15 centuries, the cognitive system changed from a functional reading and 
writing, in which language was not very fluent, to a state more akin to the literacy we enjoy, 
where the material form represents language with fidelity. These threads can be detected among 
the data (fig. 4.1): Characters lost depictiveness and then simplified, suggesting written objects 
were being recognised by their features and becoming a system of contrastive elements with 
an optimised balance of local and global cues. How characters were made converged on 
wedges, improving legibility, visual discriminability and individuation, and handwriting 
became standardised, suggesting automaticity. By 2000 BC, a literacy on par with what we 
mean by the term appears to have developed. Words were no longer being split between lines 
of text (Cooper 1996), a contiguity and integrity of form consistent with object recognition. 
Cursive developed (Veldhuis 2011), showing a tolerance for ambiguity and enabling an even 
greater speed of production. Experimentation was widespread, with writing applied to many 
new purposes (Veldhuis 2012), a concern with content suggesting automaticity had repurposed 
cognitive resources like attention. And training became highly formal (Veldhuis 2014) because 
script could no longer be read without it. As the figure shows, the types and rate of change also 
decreased around this time. 
 
The Initial Model: A Critique 
The initial model provides some unique insights about the way literacy emerged in 
Mesopotamia from the behaviour of handwriting. First, it suggests that developing literacy 
involves an initial repertoire of signs with conventionalised “this-means-that” associations. 
These must be written by hand enough hours per day and days over time to train object 
recognition and afford automaticity. Signs must be simple, and the material form malleable 
enough, to enable production, repetition, recombination and change. Finally, signs must not be 
numerical, as numbers lack the lexical range, the need to include phonography and the 
ambiguity required to motivate the pursuit of greater linguistic fidelity. 
 Beyond detailing the emergence of literacy from chronological change in writing, the 
model illuminates something about our relation with material culture and its role within the 
human cognitive system. Forget, for the moment, that writing subjects language and ideas to 
 
analysis and communicates them across space and time (Hutchins 1995; Olson 1994). Instead, 
consider only its material form. It is difficult to imagine what sort of thing literacy could be 
without the material form and the behaviours that engage it. Interaction with the materiality of 
writing engages specific behaviours and psychological capacities. Over centuries of 
adjustment, the material form has become adept at eliciting specific behavioural and 
psychological responses. And yet while it changed, the material form remained synchronised 
to common behavioural and psychological capacities because it passed through the many hands 
of multi-generational collaboration. It embodies and makes available the change in behaviours 
and psychological responses realised and accumulated by past generations. It acts as a medium 
for recreating those changes in present individuals, as they learn to interact with it. And through 
characteristics and mechanisms like malleability and contrasts of form and structure, it affords 
possibilities for future change. 
 The model of how writing changes and what the changes imply cognitively has the 
potential to be expanded further. Its development was exploratory and unguided, suggesting 
any expansions and revisions should be less idiosyncratic. Further, the model does not currently 
distinguish unintentional from deliberate change, or direct from indirect influences. It does not 
examine the effects of linguistic structure (Coulmas 2003), nor consider selective, artistic or 
playfulness aspects to iconicity. Factors explainable psychologically and behaviourally, like 
standardisation and loss of depictiveness, seemed more critical to the process than ones that 
cannot be so explained, like lexicography. But explanatory ease is not the right criterion, and 
data should not be discarded from the model until it is been applied to at least one other case. 
It would also be desirable to specify more clearly the factors included and their level of detail, 
as well as the criteria for assessing the attainment of literacy. 
 As noted in its initial publication (Overmann 2016), Mesopotamian literacy is unlikely 
to represent a universal process. In Egypt, where writing emerged at about the same time and 
in close geographic proximity, the written form underwent not one but two phases of 
standardisation and losing depictiveness and detail, assessed by contrasting hieroglyphs with 
hieratic and demotic. Where Mesopotamian writing developed from administrative practices, 
Egyptian writing was more aligned with religious and state purposes, things affecting writing 
behaviour and likely influencing how quickly the respective systems changed. Incorporating 
cases like Egypt into the model will help gain traction on the critical changes, temporal 
sequencing and functional interdependencies inherent in the process of developing literacy. 
 
Expanding the Model: Written Change in Literacy and Beyond 
Beyond the improvements suggested in the previous section, the model might be expanded in 
at least four ways. Two potential areas for future investigation in the way literacy develops 
were suggested by Kelly (2019). First, in the case of nine scripts invented by non-literate 
individuals in the past two centuries, literacy emerged within a matter of decades or even fewer 
years, compared to the millennia or longer associated with ancient literacy. One possible 
explanation is teleological. In modern contexts, literacy is known and understood, so its 
appreciation and the role of writing and practice in achieving it guide a new script’s invention, 
even when the individuals involved might not be literate themselves. In contrast, in ancient 
times, no such guiding teleology existed or would have been possible, so the cognitive state 
emerged incrementally from socially distributed interactions with the material form. Second, 
there is a relation between sign variability and the size of the inventory of signs in a writing 
system, and this may bear on assessing the attainment of literacy, as it has implications for the 
way writing develops as a relational system. 
 
 A third area in which the model might be expanded is in the collectivist effects produced 
by the social use of tools (Overmann 2020; Overmann and Wynn 2019a, 2019b). The model 
of Mesopotamian literacy shows that sustained, societal investment in specific behaviours and 
material forms yields cognitive change and creativity that cannot be realised by single 
individuals or generations alone. This suggests that current models of tool use and cognition 
should expand beyond the individual to the group. 
 Cognitive aspects of tool use have been modelled with blacksmithing (Keller and Keller 
1996), pottery (Malafouris 2008) and stone tools (Malafouris, 2010; Wynn & Coolidge, 2010). 
These individualistic models emphasise the individual in terms of performative skill, expertise 
and aha! moments creating insights (Malafouris, Gosden and Overmann 2014; Wynn and 
Coolidge 2014). Tools structure and intensify behaviours and select individuals to specific 
tasks and social roles (Overmann 2016). The individual model does not, however, represent 
social aspects of tool use. Considered socially, tools are a collaborative medium that influences 
group behaviours and brains toward common change. Group tools also create communities of 
specialists, people able and identified for using particular tools who use them in collaboration 
with one another. 
 Group use also has an effect on tool form. Though human behaviours and brains have 
much in common, people differ in their psychological, physiological and behavioural attributes. 
Most individual variability cancels itself out—highs counteract lows—keeping tool forms 
synchronised to average capabilities while allowing tool forms to change. Synchronisation in 
turn distributes the average to new users, influencing cohesion in the group. Cumulative 
variability yields tools that remain widely accessible, despite change in form. For example, 
reading and writing require no unusual capacity in psychological processes like attention, nor 
physiological attributes like fine motor control (obviously, this means the basic ability to read 
and write, not the ability to engage all the conceptual domains made accessible by writing). 
 A fourth way the model might be expanded is in numbers, since numerical notations 
differ from writing for language in several respects (table 4.1). Numeracy and literacy are 
dissociable phenomena. That is, while some cultures have developed both, many societies 
develop numbers without writing and a few have developed writing without numbers 
(Chrisomalis 2010). They are (doubly) dissociable in a psychological sense as well, something 
that shows they are cognitive functions subserved by distinct parts of the brain (Brannon 2005; 
Carreiras et al. 2015; Varley et al. 2005). These differences have implications for the forms 
that signs take, as well as for the ways in which these forms change over time and as they are 
transmitted across languages and cultures. 
 There is a fundamental difference in how signs for numbers mean, compared to signs 
for words that are not numbers. This difference appears in writing from its very inception: Early 
signs for quantity were repeated, signs for commodity were not (e.g., VA 13629, an 
administrative tablet from the Uruk V period [3500–3350 BCE], contains nine N01, meaning 
the number nine, and one UDU sign, meaning sheep). This is because numerical signs 
instantiate quantity. That is, four wedges are four; six cones are six. Their quantity is 
unambiguous, even across languages, so these signs do not need to be specified further, even 
when conventions are added to show grouping (as in a sign that means six or ten of a lower-
value unit) or to differentiate integers from fractions. In comparison, pictographs signify their 
meaning through resemblance, ideographs through convention. This makes these signs 
ambiguous regarding the words they mean, necessitating the invention and incorporation of 
strategies like determinatives and phonography that specify the intended words by altering the 
visual appearance of the signs. 
 
 
Numerical notations Written signs for language 
• Numeracy: Ability to reason with numbers 
• Dissociable (numbers without scripts) 
• Doubly dissociable (loss of numeracy 
without loss of literacy) (Varley et al. 2005) 
• Parietal activity; no language activation 
(Amalric and Dehaene 2016) 
• Instantiate their meaning 
• Semasiographic 
• Long material prehistory (i.e., fingers, tallies, 
tokens) before the invention of writing 
• Need not be handwritten for numeracy to 
develop 
• Subset of lexicon with no phonetic values 
 = few signs (this means a system of literacy 
can never develop from writing notations for 
numbers) 
• No ambiguity; phonetic clues are undesirable 
because they degrade usability as numbers 
• Read sequentially; error-correction 
functionality can produce wrong numbers 
• Number universals (Chrisomalis 2020; 
Greenberg 1978) 
• Literacy: Ability to read and write 
• Dissociable (scripts without numbers) 
• Doubly dissociable (loss of literacy without 
loss of numeracy) (Brannon 2005) 
• Brain activity for language functions 
(Perfetti and Tan 2013) 
• Signify their meaning 
• Glottographic 
• No material prehistory before writing is 
invented 
• Must be handwritten as a critical component 
of material change 
• Entire lexicon and phonetic values required 
= many signs (this means literacy may 
develop, and may also include writing the 
phonetic values of number words) 
• High ambiguity; strategies for specifying the 
words intended are required 
• Read holistically, with error-correction 
functionality (Rayner et al. 2006) 
• Language universals (Comrie 1989) 
Table 4.1. Differences between numeracy and literacy. These differ in several respects, including the conditions 
under which they emerge, the material forms used in their representation and manipulation, their mode of 
representation, and the neural activity associated with their psychological functioning. The list is not exhaustive 
of the differences between the two. All rights reserved. 
 
 Instantiation makes written numbers contiguous with numbers that are not written. This 
contiguity with prior forms has no counterpart in non-numerical language. That is, three fingers, 
three beads on an abacus, three cuneiform wedges and the three strokes of the Roman numeral 
III are three. Instantiation is meaningful without the phonetic component of language, making 
numbers a semasiographic system. Semasiographic notations like numbers and music can be 
read in any language because they are semantically meaningful but not phonetically specified, 
allowing for radically different choices of words and syntax (fig. 4.4). The expression 2 + 2 = 4, 
for example, can be put into words—with equal plausibility—as “two plus two equals four,” “the 
number two added to itself yields four,” “four is the sum of two and two,” “deux plus deux est 
quatre,” or “liǎng jiā èr shì sì.” 
 The lack of any need for phonetic specification meant that the Sumerian words for 
numbers went unrecorded for nearly a thousand years after writing was invented. Further, when 
the phonetic component of number words was recorded, it appears to have been a response to a 
very specific circumstance: In the middle of the 3rd millennium BC, Semitic-speaking scribes in 
the city of Ebla apparently felt the need to learn the Sumerian number words in addition to the 
Sumerian notations (Edzard 1980; Friberg 1986; Pettinato 1981). This is much like someone 
today might learn the Latin words for numbers—ūnus, duo, trēs, quattuor, quīnque,  … ūndecim, 
duodēcim, trēdecim, quattuordecim, quīndecim,  … duodēvīgintī, ūndēvīgintī, vīgintī—in 
addition to the Roman numerals I, II, III, IV, V, … XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, … XVIII, XIX and 




Fig. 4.4. Semasiographic and glottographic writing. While semasiographic notations (top) like numbers are 
developed in linguistic contexts—that is, the people making and inventing them undoubtedly speak a language 
(Hyman 2006)—these notations carry no phonetic clues to the actual words. Examples include numbers and musical 
notations. In contrast, glottographic forms (bottom) are tied to specific words in particular languages, like the words 
“I can see you” in English (rebus writing), Chinese (logographic), Japanese (syllabic) and German (alphabetic). This 
requires the inclusion of clues to the sounds of the words, their phonographic component. All rights reserved. 
 
 Instantiation has little parallel in writing for non-numerical language, since there is no 
inherent “sheep-ness” to the letters U D U or a quartered circle.1 For these signs, specifying 
the intended non-numerical words means the signs had to be modified to include phonetic or 
determinative clues that indicated either the word itself or the type of word it was. That is, 
meaning signified through resemblance and convention is ambiguous in a way instantiation is 
not; this puts pressure on signs for non-numerical language to improve their ability to specify 
the words intended. This in turn requires the inclusion of phonographic and other techniques 
and conventions for specifying words, making writing for non-numerical language 
glottographic (Hyman 2006; Sampson 1999). Glottographic writing represents the words of 
particular languages, like the pictures representing the words “I can see you” in English through 
the rebus principle and the logographic, syllabic and alphabetic scripts representing the same 
words in Chinese, Japanese and German (fig. 4.4). As was discussed, numerical notations like 
“7” and “13” do not need such phonetic specification, and in fact, phonography reduces their 
ability to represent spatial, topological and geometric relations, things essential to the pattern 
recognition and information manipulation that is mathematics. This quality means using 
numbers does not require knowing the associated language, the difference between using 
Roman numerals and knowing their names in Latin. Words for numbers like “seven” and 
“thirteen,” on the other hand, require both knowing the particular language and being able to 
read the associated script. Number-words do not have the same ability to preserve relations, 
make patterns accessible or manipulate information: Consider the increased difficulty of 
 
1 Geometrical shapes as used in Mesopotamian writing were not unambiguous examples of meaning by 
instantiation. For example, niĝin2 was a circle that as a noun meant “total, sum; (the) whole, entirety” (ePSD 2015) 
and as a verb meant “to encircle” and “to go around” (ePSD 2015; ETCSL 2006). In mathematical use, NIGIN 
meant “to make hold” (Høyrup 2002, 45). As a written form, niĝin2 might be said to instantiate its meaning. 
However, it does not appear to have been used to mean circle, though its semantic range was related to one. 
Further, it can also be said to resemble: It meant encircle because it looked like a circle. Such signs also emerged 
later than the numerical impressions in question (e.g., the earliest attestations of niĝin2 are dated to the Uruk III 
period, 3200–3000 BCE; CDLI 2015; ePSD 2015). 
 
performing addition on a vocabulary list instead of numerical notations, or trying to do algebra 
with narrative paragraphs instead of equations. 
 
 
Fig. 4.5. Old Babylonian mathematical tablet (BM 13901). Problem 1 from the obverse, column 1, lines 1–4 as 
(top) translated by Thureau-Dangin (1936, 31) and (bottom) put into equations by Høyrup (2002, 11); (middle) 
the English translation is by the author. All rights reserved. 
 
 Numbers have a much longer material prehistory than their involvement with writing, 
as they can be represented and manipulated with devices like fingers, tallies and tokens 
(Overmann 2018). That is, numeracy, the ability to reason with numbers, does not require 
numbers be written. This contrasts with non-numerical language, where handwriting is an 
essential part of developing literacy: Simply, if societies do not write by hand, they will not 
and cannot become literate. While numbers do not need to be written, handwritten notations 
arguably cause a dramatic change in numeracy. This is because of the neurological 
reorganisation that occurs when signs are handwritten, a phenomenon that includes signs for 
numbers. Handwriting numbers is associated with three distinct elaborational effects: 
1. Numbers that are not written are collections, like seven fingers, seven notches on a tally 
or seven cone-shaped tokens. Numbers that are written become entities, recognised 
topologically through their features. This is true even if they are composed of discrete 
elements, like the three strokes of the Roman numeral III or the seven wedges in the 
cuneiform number 7. 
2. Functionally, written numbers are concise to a degree other material forms of numbers 
are not. Concision let relations like multiplication and reciprocity be collected into 
tables, which scribes learned as part of their training. This data would redefine numbers 
through their relations to each other, making them entities in a relational system. 
3. Written non-numerical language was critical to developing mathematics. As writing 
became more expressive, it was used to record calculations, not as results, as was true 
with earlier technologies like tokens, and not as equations, the more elaborated form 
we would use today. Instead, calculations were recorded as narrative descriptions, like 
the 2nd millennium area calculation on the Old Babylonian mathematical tablet known 
as BM 13901 (Høyrup 1993, 2002, 2010, 2013), an extract of which is shown in fig. 
4.5. It would take another several millennia for such narrative descriptions to be refined 
as semasiographic forms like our plus and minus signs (Schulte 2015). 
 
 Numerical representations instantiate quantity, and quantity is something humans 
perceive through an evolutionarily ancient ability, the number-sense we share with other 
species (Coolidge and Overmann 2012; Piazza and Izard 2009). Our perception of quantity 
means that we can recognise small quantities—one, two and three—without counting (Dehaene 
2003; Fechner 1860; Weber 1834). And without counting, quantities larger than about four are 
just “many,” but in this range we appreciate bigger and smaller in groups, assuming the 
difference is above a threshold of noticeability. Respectively, these abilities are called 
subitisation and magnitude appreciation. 
 How our perceptual experience of quantity affects multielement numerical signs like 
those of cuneiform is shown with tally marks in fig. 4.6. The lowest, one through three, can be 
appreciated without counting because they are subitisable. More than about four marks are 
difficult to appreciate because there are more than we can subitise. In this range, we appreciate 
differences in magnitude, like seeing that on the lower row, there are fewer to the left and more 
to the right. This perceptual experience influences numerical form. Groups with subitisable 
elements are appreciable, so their forms neither need nor undergo much alteration. Groups 
higher than the subitising range are rearranged as subitisable subgroups. As quantity continues 
to increase, these too become increasingly difficult to appreciate, so at some point—ten in 
cuneiform—they might be “bundled” or grouped. In between subitising and bundling, 
subitisable subgroups remain under pressure to be counted, making it likely they will 
eventually simplify as forms that do not involve counting. 
 
 
Fig. 4.6. Tally marks for the numbers one through ten. Unmodified marks appear in black, grouped or 
conventionalised ones in grey. One, two and three (top row, left) are subitisable and thus recognisable without 
modification. Four and higher fall within the range of magnitude appreciation, recognisable as bigger and smaller in 
groups (as for example, recognising without counting that the six to the far left in the middle row are fewer than the 
ten to the far right on the same row). As written notations, quantities higher than about four tend to be grouped in 
subitisable amounts (shown in grey below the unmodified notations). This strategy too encounters the limit on 
perceptual appreciation (as in the groups for seven and higher on the bottom row), necessitating the incorporation of 
strategies like bundling, as in the wedge that represents ten (bottom row, far right). All rights reserved. 
 
 Signs for subitisable numbers tend to be highly conserved, because they instantiate 
quantity in the range that we can appreciate without counting (fig. 4.7, top row). Large numbers 
like 7 (fig. 4.7, middle row) are initially grouped as smaller, appreciable quantities, as was true 
of cuneiform. Over time, these become forms that avoid counting, like the Hindu–Arabic 
numeral 7; once this happens, such signs become increasingly subject to mechanisms that 
 
change written forms, like visual distinguishability and individuation. For both these 
categories, semasiography means that numbers can be—and often are—adopted across 
languages and cultures without phonetic or semantic adaptation. This limits the amount of 
change these written forms undergo in transmission across languages and cultures. 
 
 
Fig. 4.7. Change in numerical and non-numerical signs. The signs shown are related, but as represented, the 
lineages are incomplete. Signs for numbers instantiate, placing them under distinct neurofunctional pressures 
influencing their forms and how these forms change as they are adopted across languages and cultures. Signs for 
subitisable numbers are under the least pressure, so their form is conserved to a high degree; signs for numbers 
above the subitising range are under pressure to simplify as forms that do not require counting, which subjects 
them to the processes and mechanisms of writing change. Non-numerical signs must incorporate phonography to 
reduce ambiguity about which words they intend; phonographic clues increase the visual complexity of these 
signs, subjecting them to the greatest amount of change in form as they transmit across languages and cultures. 
Data sourced and images redrawn from Chrisomalis (2010), Ifrah (2000), Nissen (1986), Papadoupoulos (2016), 
Tompack (1978) and the CDLI. All rights reserved. 
 
 By comparison, writing for non-numerical language undergoes the most change. It is 
already under pressure to achieve greater semantic and phonetic specificity. When a system of 
writing is adapted to different languages, it initially does a poor job of representing at least 
some concepts and sounds, by an amount that varies with the affinities between cultures and 
languages. This keeps writing under pressure to specify concepts and sounds, including those 
of the adopting populations. This same pattern holds in Chinese (not shown; interested readers 
may consult Overmann 2020). Subitisable numbers change the least, large numbers by an 
intermediate amount and non-numerical words the most. This is despite the fact that 
transmission occurs across a relative homogeneity of language and culture. The form of the 
higher numbers additionally suggests they had been available for some time, long enough to 
become forms that did not require counting, before they appeared in the oracle bones. 
 
 When change in the material form of written numbers is considered and contrasted with 
change in writing for non-numerical language, the overall pattern that emerges is this: Signs 
for numbers instantiate; so small numbers conserve, while large numbers simplify, and both 
are relatively insensitive to changes in languages and cultures. Signs for non-numerical 
language signify, so they must specify meanings and sounds, and this subjects them to the 
greatest amount of change, especially when they transmit across languages and cultures. 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
Modelling how the material form of writing changed in original contexts and interpreting that 
change through the theories and methods of cognitive archaeology is a unique way to analyse 
writing systems, one with the potential to realize novel insights. As reviewed here, this type of 
analysis has shed new light on the question of how societies of average people were able to 
achieve a complex cultural system like literacy (also see Overmann 2016, 2017, 2019). This 
required them to sustain a particular behaviour with a specific material form (writing, as verb 
and noun respectively) over generations. Each generation’s engagement of writing changed 
their behaviours and psychological processing incrementally, enabling them to change the form 
of writing, however slightly. Change in the form of writing, in turn, accumulated and 
redistributed the incremental behavioural and psychological changes in the users. This iterative 
process would ultimately realize a material form and an associated cognitive state—script and 
literacy—that were well beyond what any one individual could have invented. 
 The model has the potential to generate further insights. Several ways in which it might 
be formalized and expanded were discussed. Some proposals would add depth, detail and 
rigour to the examination of how literacy emerges from the collective practice of writing. 
Another proposal for the model’s expansion concerned the social use of tools and their 
collective effects. Work on this front is ongoing: for example, insights gained from analysing 
writing as a self-organizing system were recently applied to lithic technologies as they are 
known in the archaeological record of some 2 million years ago as part of a multiyear 
collaboration on 4E cognition in the Lower Palaeolithic (Overmann 2020). Change in the 
material form of written numbers also seems particularly appropriate for this type of analysis 
and was accordingly discussed here at some length. The initial conclusion is that written 
representations for numbers and language experience distinct neurofunctional pressures that 
influence the forms they take, how these forms transmit across languages and cultures and how 
these forms change over time. 
 An approach wherein writing is treated as a material form tractable to the theories and 
methods of cognitive archaeology has the potential to illuminate the processes whereby 
complex cultural systems developed in ancient times. It can also give us insight into the co-
evolution of cognition and culture more generally, in technologies and cognitive states beyond 
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